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Abstract 
Although the role of local Human Rights Organizations (HROs) has 
attracted some attention in the transitional justice literature, this note 
from the field examines an under-studied HRO strategy: the 
production and systematization of information. In particular, it focuses 
on the Center for Legal and Social Studies’ (CELS) efforts to promote 
accountability for the gross human rights violations committed during 
Argentina’s last period of military rule (1976–1983). It argues that the 
production and systematization of information is foundational for 
transitional justice advocacy, and CELS’ work has influenced 
Argentina’s transitional justice processes and the broader struggle for 
accountability. The main focus of the note is the use of information 
for post-transition legal accountability, the purpose of which is to set 
judging standards and point out difficulties in prosecuting systematic 
human rights violations. This is addressed by describing a specific 
information strategy implemented by CELS. This information deals 
with the status of trials for past human rights violations ongoing 
throughout Argentina. 
 
Introduction 
Argentina’s transitional justice experience for the gross human rights 
violations committed during its last period of military rule (1976–83) 
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has been extensively explored by scholars and has often been 
considered “exceptional” for several reasons. First, Argentina is the 
only country in Latin America, and one of the few in the world, where 
military high commanders were prosecuted early in the transition.1 
Second, in the three decades following the transition, the country has 
implemented what can be considered “a full menu” of transitional 
justice mechanisms: a truth commission, restitution of rights, 
reparations, criminal and ‘truth’ trials, and lustration.2 
To explain the existence of such a remarkable transitional 
justice approach, scholars have often referred to the important role of 
local human rights organizations (HROs), and have studied their 
political actions, such as denunciations and mobilization both 
                                                          
1 See, among others, Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996) and Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, ¡Ni olvido ni perdón? Derechos 
Humanos y tensiones cívico-militares en la transición argentina (Buenos Aires: Centro de 
Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1991). 
2 Catalina Smulovitz, “The Past Is Never Dead: Accountability and Justice for Past 
Human Rights Violations in Argentina” in Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano, 
eds., After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 2012). 
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domestically and transnationally. 3  They also have employed legal 
strategies, lodging cases in local and regional courts.4 
This note from the field analyzes a different strategy 
implemented by Argentine HROs, namely the production and 
systematization of information. This underappreciated activity is 
foundational, and has influenced Argentina’s transitional justice 
process and the broader struggle for accountability. Although the 
production of information is a central element of transitional justice 
processes, it has not received adequate attention. Existing studies focus 
on how HROs use information to create awareness and to publicly 
                                                          
3 For only a partial list of this literature, see Acuña and Smulovitz 1991; Alison Brysk, 
“From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human 
Rights in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 26.3 (1993): 259-85; Alison Brysk, 
The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994); Alyson Brisk, “The Politics of Measurement: 
Counting the Disappeared in Argentina,” Human Rights Quarterly 16.4 (1994) 676-92; 
Alison Brysk, ed., Globalization and Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002); Elizabeth Jelin, “La política de la memoria: el movimiento de derechos 
humanos y la construcción democrática en la Argentina” in Carlos Acuña et al., eds., 
Juicios, castigos y memorias. Derechos humanos y justicia en la política argentina (Buenos Aires: 
Editores Nueva Visión, 1995); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond 
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1998). 
4  See, for example, Jo-Marie Burt, “The New Accountability Agenda in Latin 
America: The Promise and Perils of Human Rights Prosecutions” in Katherine Hite 
and Mark Ungar, eds., Sustaining Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: Strategies from 
Latin America (Washington DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and 
the John Hopkins University Press, 2012); Cath Collins, Post-Transitional Justice: 
Human Rights in Chile and El Salvador (University Park: Penn State University Press, 
2010); Par Engstrom and Gabriel Pereira, “From Amnesty to Accountability: The 
Ebb and Flow in the Search for Justice in Argentina,” in Francesca Lessa and Leigh 
Payne, eds., Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and 
International Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2011). 
Lorena Balardini  236 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 233-261 
 
denounce the crimes to obtain condemnation.5 Yet few studies analyze 
the way HROs use it to achieve accountability.  
Here, I focus on HROs’ data-collection strategies, considered 
in the context of cooperation and tension between them and state 
agencies. I argue that data collection first and systematization 
afterwards were both crucial information strategies in the struggle for 
the recognition of human rights offences and for them to be 
considered in the framework of transitional justice mechanisms. In 
addition, implementing such strategies led to the emergence of an 
“information policy” that has been an important contribution of the 
HROs to the transitional justice process. In particular, it allowed 
human rights violations to be publicly recognized, and to turn them 
into criminal cases.  
Moreover, this note focuses on the uses of information for 
post-transition legal accountability, the purpose of which is to set judicial 
standards and point out gaps and difficulties in prosecuting gross 
human rights violations. This is addressed by describing a specific 
information strategy implemented by one HRO: the Center for Legal 
and Social Studies (CELS for its Spanish acronym). The information 
produced by CELS deals with the status of trials for past human rights 
violations ongoing throughout the country. This information strategy 
corresponds to the current stage of the transitional justice process in 
Argentina, which the literature has characterized as “post-transition” 
or “late justice.”6 Its antecedent is information on crimes, victims, and 
                                                          
5  See Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”; Shayne Weyker, “The Ironies of 
Information Technology” in Alison Brysk ed., Globalization and Human Rights 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); Richard Claude and 
Thomas Jabine, “Exploring Human Rights Issues with Statistics” in Richard Claude 
and Thomas Jabine, eds., Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991). 
6 Post-transitional justice focuses on the continued legal pursuit of justice for past 
human rights violations in order to dismantle amnesty provisions that prevented 
criminal judgment. See Collins 2010: 2-3. Among the external phenomena that 
influenced this process is progress in international human rights law; for further 
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perpetrators produced by HROs during the dictatorship and the 
transition.  
 
Information Strategies in Transitional Justice Processes 
This note’s focus is on a particular kind of information, which has been 
systematized through a series of operations. Michel Foucault defined 
systematization as a technique for the standardization of records that 
enables correlating different elements of a phenomenon elaborating 
series and patterns, and setting standards. He attributes decisive 
importance in this process to the so-called “small techniques” of 
notation, registration, and creation of records. Such documentary 
techniques allow the creation of a “case,” a set of circumstances that 
qualify as facts.7 This note presents a thorough description of these 
“small techniques” deployed by Argentine HROs in the post-transition 
period.  
                                                          
detail see Leonardo Filippini, “Criminal Prosecution in the Search for Justice,” in 
CELS and ICTJ, eds., Making Justice: Further Discussions on the Prosecution of Crimes against 
Humanity in Argentina (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2011). Other external 
phenomena include the “Pinochet effect,” which refers to the impact of the 
detention of Chilean ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998 in London, and the cases 
filed overseas against Argentine military personnel based upon universal jurisdiction. 
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human 
Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) and Lorena Balardini, “Argentina: the 
Regional Protagonist,” in Elin Skaar, Cath Collins and Jemima Garcia-Godos, eds., 
Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven Road from Impunity towards Accountability 
(London: Routledge, forthcoming). In this note, I consider Argentina’s post-
transitional justice period to start with the first judicial decision declaring the amnesty 
laws unconstitutional in 2001 in the landmark “Simón” case filed by CELS and 
Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo. The Supreme Court completely dismantled the 
juridical effects of amnesty through its final 2005 ruling in the case. See CELS, 
“Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2008,” (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI 
Editores, 2008): 51. 
7 Michel Foucault,  Vigilar y castigar. Nacimiento de la prisión. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI 
Editores, 1976): 195-96. 
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The institutional frame for the deployment of these techniques 
is either an authoritarian regime that systematically violates human 
rights or a democratic government during transition/post-transition 
that faces serious challenges, among them the production of reliable 
information on past crimes and/or on its own transitional justice 
policies. NGOs demand tools, methodologies, and specific inputs to 
monitor state actions and policies. Following Laura Pautassi, 
incorporating new and better instruments for the measurement of 
rights constitutes a useful tool for the processes of evaluation and 
supervision of state human rights obligations.8 Damián Loreti and Luis 
Lozano argue that the “right to information” involves positive state 
obligations, as it must remove any obstacles for access to produce, 
preserve, and disseminate information. They highlight that 
information relating to gross human rights violations should be 
available for interested parties.9 Following Valeria Barbuto, this note 
reflects upon the production of information on human rights 
violations as a territory of networking alliances as well as tensions and 
disputes.10  
 The information strategies implemented by Argentine HROs 
were sustained in exchanges and learning within the framework of 
transnational advocacy networks. Exchanges between these networks’ 
members consist of a “dense flow of information and services.”11 This 
                                                          
8  Laura Pautassi “Indicadores en materia de derechos económicos, sociales y 
culturales. Más allá de la medición” in Víctor Abramovich and Laura Pautassi, eds., 
La medición de derechos en las políticas sociales (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Puerto, 2010): 
5. 
9 Damián Loreti and Luis Lozano, El derecho a comunicar. Los conflictos en torno a la libertad 
de expresión en las sociedades contemporáneas (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2014): 
253. 
10 Valeria Barbuto “Reflexiones sobre los procesos de documentación de la violencia 
estatal como estrategia de intervención política y jurídica,” paper presented at the 
VIII Meeting of Mercosur Anthropology (Buenos Aires, 2009): 14. 
11 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Human 
Rights Network in Latin America,” in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds., 
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occurs through exchanges of reports, which are intended to influence, 
using international partnerships, domestic politics. This is what 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have called the boomerang pattern, 
in which local organizations generate a change in the policy of their 
own state by working with international partners who exert pressure. 
These authors developed a typology of tactics that networks use in 
their efforts to persuade society; among them there are information 
politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable 
information and move it where it has more impact.12 
As part of these networks, HROs’ role in information politics 
is crucial. They serve as alternative sources of information, especially 
when a state is charged in the public sphere with systematic human 
rights violations.13  Human Rights Information and Documentation 
Systems (HURIDOCS) has argued that information is essential for the 
protection and promotion of human rights:  
 
There is need to promote the work of documentation, 
organization and classification of data; this way, essential 
elements to make decisions promptly are provided. 
Documentation must be oriented to action, to the needs of its 
users. This work involves increasing access to sources of 
information, adopting modern classification systems that take 
the advances of computer science and establishing expedited 
channels to disseminate the information.14 
 
 Information flows in these networks include claims and 
testimonies of crimes. HROs’ emphasis on collecting testimonies that 
                                                          
Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996): 73. 
12 Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13, 16. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
14HURIDOCS, “Encuesta sobre la Disponibilidad de información y documentación 
de derechos humanos en América Latina y el Caribe” (Roma: 1983): 110. 
Lorena Balardini  240 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 233-261 
 
document repression serve a legal function and promote an 
interpretation of what happened during illegal repression. Testimonies 
help to establish a pattern of state responsibility, strengthening HROs’ 
claim for accountability.15 As part of information politics, activists who 
use testimonies frame them simply, because their purpose is to 
persuade people and stimulate them to act. When the purpose is to 
build a case to obtain legal accountability, however, Keck and Sikkink 
caution that there are several layers of prior mediation/translation 
performed on the information. Systematization is the tool for this. 
However, they argue that HROs legitimize the use of information from 
testimonies, supplementing it with technical and statistical 
information: what they consider “a two-level approach” as part of the 
effort to make a more precise description of the facts. 16  Dorothy 
Thomas has described this as “human rights methodology,” which is 
based on producing credible, well-documented information to 
promote change.17 “The message matters,” says Alison Brysk.18 HROs’ 
ability to succeed in their accountability goals is related to the content 
of the complaints. In terms of the information they produce, Argentine 
HROs provide coherence and credibility. The “internationalization” of 
their information contributed to the construction of this credibility and 
somehow also to the protection of organizations during the 
authoritarian period.  
 Shayne Weyker claims that “well-researched, professionally 
presented, truthful and factual information, turned out quickly enough 
to be passed on to the right people at the right time” produces results 
for HROs. 19  They use factual information to reach international 
audiences and challenge local institutions. Brysk argues that, as long as 
                                                          
15 Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”: 14-15. 
16 Keck and Sikkink 1998: 19. 
17 Dorothy Thomas, “Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure,” in 
Joanna Kerr ed., Ours by Right: Women’s Rights as Human Rights (London: Zed Books, 
1993): 83. 
18 Brysk, “The Politics of Measurement”: 13. 
19 Weyker 2002: 116-17. 
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the state cannot monopolize information and legitimacy, organizations 
and social movements gain power by projecting “cognitive and 
affective” information to form international alliances. This distinction 
between two types of information can be useful to understand the 
production of information by HROs in Argentina. It allows glimpsing 
an informal “division of labor” between different organizations around 
the production of information between: a) Information as “political 
theater”: affective information to create public awareness of the 
crimes; and b) “Documentation”: cognitive information that gives an 
understanding of the extension, details, and mechanics of the problem, 
needed to take policy decisions. 20 
 Examples of the first type of information are the strategies 
deployed by relatives’ organizations. They issue press reports and 
articles in national and international media and letters to well-known 
actors in politics, religion, and culture to denounce crimes. This type 
of information strategy seeks to create an emotional impact by 
appealing to symbols and resources linked to the affection and the 
impact of repression in families.21 The information that can be framed 
in Brysk’s “cognitive” category is the type on which this note will focus 
because it corresponds to the monitoring and systematization 
strategies. Systematization contributes to the identification of 
repressive patterns, which are crucial for the construction of criminal 
cases.  
 However, it is important to add two other key elements. First, 
Weyker’s concept of “computerization” is important. Information lies 
at the heart of what HROs do, and technological advances allow them 
to manage it more effectively. The first real strength of information 
technology for HROs is that computers improve the ability to marshal 
facts (cognitive information) on their side into a persuasive, logical 
argument. Information technology speeds up, enlarges the scale, and 
                                                          
20 Brysk 1993: 264. 
21 This type of information has been collected from the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo’s 
historical archive. 
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improves the quality of information collection and processing by 
HROs. 22  The novelty of the computer in the history of these 
techniques is that it facilitates the exteriorization of human beings’ 
mental faculties for information processing. 23  A final important 
element is the production of statistics. Richard Claude and Thomas 
Jabine argue that those who work in the human rights field know that 
fixing the responsibility for violations requires an assessment of how, 
how much, and why human freedoms are in danger. Regarding human 
rights data, statistics can make the difference. They intend to “set the 
record straight,” which is of primary importance in the human rights 
field. These authors bring an interesting approach; they believe that 
HRO/NGO reports do not always provide systematic or 
comprehensive data. However, they point out that they provide 
monitoring.24 Human rights monitoring is able to track changes in 
policy when there are quantifiable standards by which to present the 
data.  
 
Information and Transitional Justice in Argentina  
The systematic repression perpetrated during the last dictatorship in 
Argentina established a complex social environment in which several 
HROs were active. Some of these groups existed before the conflict 
emerged; others were formed by families during the escalation of 
violence. This way, the fight for human rights became an important 
social movement.25 CELS has played a critical role in HROs’ post-
transitional information strategies. It was created in mid-1979 by a 
group of parents of disappeared people. However, the organization did 
                                                          
22 Weyker 2002: 115-18. 
23 Alain Supiot, Homo juridicus. Ensayo sobre la función antropológica del derecho (Buenos 
Aires: Siglo XXI editors, 2007): 170. 
24 Claude and Jabine 1991: 5-7,16. 
25 See, among the extensive literature that covers this subject, Ludmila Da Silva 
Catela, No habrá flores en las tumbas del pasado. La experiencia de reconstrucción del mundo de 
los familiares de desaparecidos. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Al Margen, 2001): 65-66; Jelin 
1995: 105; Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: 45-49. 
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not base its identity on this condition, but rather on its professionalism 
and its founders’ legal background. It also sought to reproduce the 
pragmatic and professional manner of international entities, especially 
regarding its work with information. According to CELS, “a testimony 
or complaint was not enough; systematic documentation work was 
needed with permanent contact with these international institutions to 
be able to call attention to the serious violations to human rights that 
were being carried out in Argentina.”26   
CELS and other Argentine HROs have been pioneers in the 
use of information strategies. They have designed tools ranging from 
the simplest or “artisanal” to the most methodologically sophisticated 
in order to produce reliable data supportive of their demands for 
accountability. The dictatorship had kidnapped, tortured, murdered, 
and disappeared its political opponents. Legal accountability for these 
crimes was a primary objective during and after the transition. Here, it 
is important to highlight that the legal field and the set of rules 
established by it are an important influence on the strategies designed 
by HROs in the pursuit of accountability.27 Legal professionals also 
had a clear influence on CELS’ strategies analyzed here.  
 HROs’ systematization strategies have evolved over time. 
During military rule, in the context of the 1979 visit of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to the country, 
HROs emphasized the production of repressive patterns that reflected 
regularities in the cases. It was the first effort to move from the 
                                                          
26 Comisión Provincial de la Memoria, Historia de Organismos de Derechos Humanos - 25 
años de Resistencia. Dossier 4: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales  (Buenos Aires: 
No Date).  
27  Pierre Bourdieu defines the juridical field as “the site of a competition for 
monopoly of the right to determine the law. Within this field there occurs a 
confrontation among actors possessing a technical competence which is inevitably 
social and which consists essentially in the socially recognized capacity to interpret a 
corpus of texts sanctifying a correct or legitimized vision of the social world.” See 
Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” 
Hastings Law Journal 38 (1987): 805-53. 
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documentation and gathering of information to the systematization of 
testimonies, even before the possibility of using technological tools. 
All these elements were included in a “secret” report that the 
organizations delivered to the IACHR.28 During the transition, building 
legal cases to be brought to the courts, and the search for the truth drove the 
strategy. In 1983, HROs formed the “Technical Commission for Data 
Collection” to pool all the information from their archives and to put 
together cases in a complete fashion in order to deliver all the 
information to the newly elected government. Settling a legal case 
implies defining the circumstances of the repressive act, as well as 
identifying possible perpetrators. The database of the Technical 
Commission was ahead of its time because it provided the unique 
opportunity to relate repressive acts with responsible parties and locate 
them within the military chain of command. The commission prepared 
a report for the newly-elected Congress and shared the database with 
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons’ (Spanish 
acronym CONADEP) Documentation and Data Processing unit.29 
After the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws put a halt to criminal 
cases, HROs produced statistics on “people no longer prosecuted” to highlight 
the injustice of amnesty and to hopefully rejuvenate the criminal justice 
process. 30  During the post-transition phase, there were changes in 
information strategies. After the reopening of criminal cases for 
                                                          
28 Unfortunately, all the copies are lost; research was based on a draft found in CELS’ 
archives and in an interview with the only living person who was involved. Author 
interview with Noemi Labrune, president of Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos 
Humanos (APDH) Neuquén and former member of CELS, 29 January 2014. All 
author interviews were conducted in Buenos Aires.  
29 The report was delivered on 2 August 1984. A draft of the report was also found 
in CELS’ archives. Author interviews with Rafael Mazzella, computer expert from 
the Technical Commission, 28 March 2014 and with Daniel Salvador, secretary of 
Documentation and Data Processing from CONADEP, 26 November 2014. 
30 This was published in the booklet “Guilty for society, unpunished by the law” in 
1988. The perpetrators are not referred to as “acquitted” or “amnestied” but as “no 
longer being prosecuted” (desprocesados, in Spanish), as a sign of protest.  
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dictatorship-era human rights violations, HROs focused on bringing 
cases to courts throughout the country. The cases were based upon 
information produced in the framework of transitional justice 
mechanisms during the transition. This way, during the post-transition 
period, HROs focused on the production of monitoring information, 
as will be described next.  
 
“Measuring Justice”: Databases for Monitoring Human Rights 
Trials 
This section focuses on CELS’ human rights trials monitoring. During 
the transition, CELS reinforced its international position, not only in 
the search for solidarity as during the conflict, but also through the 
search for funds. Access to economic resources allowed it to form paid 
technical teams early in the transition, which distinguishes it from 
other HROs that had serious financial problems.31 Today, it is one of 
the most professionalized Argentine HROs and is identified as “the 
technical arm of the human rights movement.”32 This condition has 
allowed it to become an important player during discussions by 
relevant state actors. 
The implementation of the monitoring strategy cannot be 
understood as a linear process. The needs of information and the 
accountability purposes have changed since 2001 and this has 
influenced not only the methodologies but also the “uses” of the 
information produced. Three types of information use can be 
identified in the post-transition period:  
 
                                                          
31 “At the beginning of transition we started to have financial problems. Most donors 
had withdrawn their help; we never had enough money and survived out of 
volunteers.” Author interview with Bella Frizman, vice-president of APDH, 12 
November 2014. 
32  Author interview with Noemi Labrune. This aspect was also mentioned in 
interviews with Bella Frizman and Estela de Carlotto, president of Grandmothers of 
Plaza de Mayo, 17 February 2014. 
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1) Information to legitimate the trials, at the very 
beginning of the process (2001-2006);  
2) Information to set legal standards, when criminal 
investigations were finally active (2007-2008); and 
3) Information to identify gaps in the judicial framework 
for trying these cases and support state agencies in 
charge of the trials (2009-today).  
 
Each is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Information to Legitimate the Trials (2001-2006) 
CELS began to gather information on the criminal cases for the 
dictatorship-era human rights offences after the first ruling in the 
“Simón” case in 2001. Victor Abramovich, former CELS executive 
director, remembers that there was a general sensation within the 
government that the trials were as “destabilizing” as during the 
transition. Against this backdrop, CELS recognized the necessity of 
producing information to grant the effort legitimacy, as part of the 
accountability process. As Abramovich noted: 
 
During the year 2002 began the discussion about the reopening 
of the trials. Government was concerned they were going to 
involve 5,000 active military, causing institutional 
destabilization. For us then it was important to decrease the 
fear that the reopening of the trials was going to generate a 
scenario of lack of governability… the information at that 
moment was part of the debate of the establishment of the 
trials policy agenda.33 
 
The first use of information was to enable trials to move 
forward, or, as Abramovich says, “in order to be able to open up for 
                                                          
33 Author interview with Víctor Abramovich, former executive director of CELS 
(2001-2005), 10 February 2014. 
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debate whether or not to prosecute with certain information.”34 CELS’ 
goal at this stage was to promote debate on the legitimacy of trial-
reopening by centering the discussion on what impact they would 
have, how many trials there would be, how much time the prosecution 
would require, and who would be investigated. This information came 
from the judiciary, the institution in charge of carrying out the 
prosecution, and it was not easily accessible to HROs, which at this 
stage had few allies in the judicial branch.35 CELS had been fighting to 
dismantle the amnesty in legal venues, and appeared to be the best-
positioned organization for the job. The differences from the 
production of information during the transition were evident. As 
Carolina Varsky noted, “Data had to reflect how many people could 
be on trial, not how many people were responsible for State Terrorism. 
This information could only be obtained by an organization working 
in the courts.”36 
 CELS then began to compile information about the trials in 
which it acted as plaintiff.37 Natalia Federman, at that time a CELS 
lawyer, was in charge of keeping this record. She pointed out the 
complexity of accessing information and the technological problems 
faced.38 The first registry was an Excel spreadsheet, a sample of which 
is presented in Figure 1. In it were listed the names of the accused, the 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Offences against human rights are dealt with in the federal justice system, which 
oversees major and complex crimes. Cases may be heard at four levels: first instance 
courts, appeal courts (FCAs), a “Court of Cassation” (an intermediate review body, 
only for criminal cases, that provides a second level of appeal convictions or 
acquittals), and the Supreme Court, which is the definitive instance. The charges 
brought are those specified in the Argentine criminal code, as in the Juntas trial.  
36 Author interview with Carolina Varsky, former Litigation director of CELS, 12 
February 2014. 
37 During the post-transitional justice process, many HROs have acted as “plaintiff,” 
a status the current Criminal Procedural Code (sanctioned in 1991) assigns to 
accusations made by individuals or private organizations. This was not available 
during the transition period. 
38 Author interview with Natalia Federman, former CELS’ lawyer, 10 February 2014. 
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cases in which they were involved, and the status of the legal 
proceedings. The information was then matched up with data collected 
in previous years such as the branch of the armed forces or unit of the 
security services to which the accused belonged; the clandestine 
detention center where they acted; as well as their nicknames, military 
ranks, and other items that HROs had systematized during the 
transition.  
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Figure 1: Excel Spreadsheet with Information about the Accused and 
the Status of Legal Proceedings (CELS Information, 2003)39 
  
                                                          
39 Columns refer to (from left to right): Last name, name, legal status, case 1 to 5. 
Source: Natalia Federman. 
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Information as Standard Setting (2007-2008) 
This information strengthened the transitional justice process. At the 
beginning of 2007, the three branches of government generally 
supported criminal prosecution. Cases were soon active throughout 
the country. However, there was a lack of reliable official information 
with respect to case policy.40  
The concern was no longer “how many?” but rather “how?” 
In other words, the emphasis shifted to the quality of the trials. CELS’ 
interest was not only the trials’ mere existence, but also whether they 
complied with certain prosecution standards. In particular, CELS was 
concerned with the amount of time the judiciary was taking to 
investigate the cases. In light of this, CELS began work on a statistical 
methodology to monitor the concrete problems of the trials and to 
propose a set of standards for their judgment, and design legal public 
policy strategies.41 
In this “second moment” of CELS trial monitoring work, the 
first need was to design a national record. Through a network of 
contacts, CELS managed to gather information on trials from all over 
the country. Then, a set of three databases was created to measure the 
development of the trials, ranging from the progress of each 
investigation to the changes in the procedural status of the accused.42 
Each one of these databases has its own criteria for selection and 
loading of information, as well as specific variables: 
  
· Database of defendants: it gathers information on those people 
who are presumed to have committed human rights violations 
                                                          
40  Cath Collins, Lorena Balardini, and Jo-Marie Burt, “Mapping Perpetrator 
Prosecutions in Latin America,” The International Journal for Transitional Justice 7:1 
(2013): 8-28.  
41 CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2012,” (Buenos Aires: 
Siglo XXI Editores, 2012): 53-54. 
42 The information in the databases is based on the CELS working paper “Manual 
for the statistical records of active cases and those accused for crimes against 
humanity in Argentina,” drafted in March 2008 and updated in August 2011. 
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during the last dictatorship and are being investigated in a 
criminal case. They can be either members of the armed forces 
or security services that existed at the moment of the events or 
civilians.  
· Database of active cases: it records all the active criminal cases 
for dictatorship-era human rights crimes in the country.  
· Database of people convicted: this includes details about the 
convictions (prison sentences, crimes charged, and type of 
responsibility of each defendant in them). 
  
 Each of these databases was designed to measure the trials’ 
outcomes, i.e. how many cases in which procedural status; how long 
were the proceedings taking by province; etc. The design of the 
variables and the monitoring system was based on the Criminal 
Procedural Code, which establishes different stages of investigation, 
and estimates times for each stage. Figure 2 provides an example of 
the information collected for these purposes. 
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Figure 2: Defendants’ Procedural Status (Argentina, December 
2007)43 
                                                          
43  Categories are those of the criminal process: convicted, prosecuted (with or 
without pre-trial detention), fugitives, lack of probable cause, and reported, among 
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Information to Identify Gaps and Advocate for Change (2009-Present) 
This led to a third moment regarding trials’ information. It was aimed 
at investigating the gaps in the judicial institutional framework for 
trying these types of complex cases and advocating for change.  
The criminal process model experienced difficulties in adapting 
to the investigation of systematic human rights violations. Data began 
to show significant delays in the carrying out of trials. During 2006 and 
2007, only two trials per year took place, in which 14 accused were 
convicted. However, in the same period, over 200 open cases and more 
than 700 accused were recorded. At this trial pace, it would be 
impossible to carry out trials within a reasonable time.44  
This problem was not entirely due to court delays. The 
organization of the trials in several jurisdictions initially involved a 
small number of victims and accused. CELS used the term “trickle-
down prosecution” to describe situations in which each complaint of 
a victim was equivalent to one legal case against one or two defendants 
without seeking common patterns among them. 45  This form of 
organization was a result of the structure of the federal judiciary and 
the usual criminal investigation. However, it multiplied cases (as 
opposed to the Juntas trial, which implied the formation of a centralized 
case structure thereby providing enormous capacity to concentrate 
information). In the post-transition period, courts and prosecutors in 
each jurisdiction were in charge of receiving requests for investigation 
and re-opening cases, which produced dispersion and made 
reconstruction difficult. This initial form of fragmented investigation 
                                                          
others. At that time, no defendants had been acquitted. See more statistics examples 
at www.cels.org.ar/blogs/estadisticas/. Source: CELS 2008. 
44 Ibid., 55-56. 
45 CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2008 and 2009,” (Buenos 
Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 2009). 
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led to an inefficient use of judicial resources and did not take into 
account the systematic nature of the crimes.46 
 In this complicated scenario, information was used to influence 
the state and promote improvements in the process. The Argentine 
government and the judiciary had not made the decision to carry out a 
strategic plan of prosecution or of monitoring the trials’ outcomes. 
This is why CELS presented a series of requests to the three branches 
of government that included the creation of agencies that would be 
responsible for public policies related to the criminal prosecution of 
dictatorship-era crimes. Among the functions or tasks that they should 
have was the production of official information about the progress of 
trials that would complement the monitoring carried out by CELS.  
 The proposed state agencies were the Unit for Coordinating 
and Monitoring Cases for Human Rights Violations Committed under 
State Terrorism, at the Attorney General’s Office (hereinafter 
Coordination Unit); a “Truth and Justice” program reporting directly 
to the executive branch, supposedly to implement a nationwide 
Witness Protection Program and carry out risk assessments of each 
trial; and a special unit of the Supreme Court,47 which was set up to 
improve the transparency of the process by communicating trial 
outcomes.48  
 Of those institutions, the one that took the prerogative to 
produce information was the Coordination Unit. Since its creation, this 
agency has developed a registry of those accused in cases for these 
crimes, and has developed organizational strategies on the trials 
throughout the country. As Alberto Saavedra, a member of the Unit, 
notes:  
                                                          
46 CELS, “Annual Report on Human Rights in Argentina, 2012,” (Buenos Aires: 
Siglo XXI Editores, 2012): 57. 
47 See www.cij.gov.ar.  
48 See “Action lines to strengthen the process of seeking truth and justice,” CELS, 
2007. Available from 
http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/actionlines.pdf 
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The Unit has become a reference; it is a centralized 
point for the information. In this sense, I believe we 
have responded to a need, that was to simplify access 
to information… I believe that, in these cases, that are 
highly sensitive and have a large social impact, society 
had the possibility to control the actors and their 
performance with respect to the cases.49  
 
 The institutional framework was complete in 2009, when an 
inter-branch commission, comprising representatives of the executive, 
the legislature, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office was created. It was 
an effort to strengthen links between state bodies working on the trials. 
However, some believe it did not produce a clearly positive impact on 
the trials.50  
 These efforts culminated in the Court of Cassation’s 
establishment of a set of practical rules to accelerate trials, prevent 
unnecessary delays, and regulate the production of evidence, 
particularly witness treatment in February 2012.51 These rules have had 
some interesting effects on the trials. For instance, the amount of time 
taken to read the accusations was reduced by almost two–thirds. In 
addition, video-conferencing was admitted as a valid way of hearing 
testimonies from witnesses who live abroad. Also, some special 
procedures were implemented so that victims and perpetrators would 
not have to share court facilities. At the same time, defendants usually 
presented claims against the rules, which typically delayed court 
                                                          
49 Author interview with Alberto Saavedra, member of the Coordination Unit, now 
named as Crimes Against Humanity Prosecutorial Unit, 12 February 2014. 
50 Author interview with Pablo Parenti, former coordinator of the Coordination 
Unit, 23 November 2012. Parenti argues that it was actually a space for debate but 
that it was very hermetic (it was hard for non-state actors to bring their demands) 
and that it was very difficult to schedule meetings regularly in order to have sustained 
and regular discussions.  
51 Resolution 1/12 of the Court of Cassation, March 2012. 
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procedures. Nevertheless, judges have consistently denied these claims 
and confirmed the constitutionality of the rules.52  
 
Remaining Challenges 
Notwithstanding these advances, the information arena was, and 
continues to be, a field of dispute among the actors involved. An 
interesting aspect of this is the resistance to the production of 
information from an internal legal culture perspective of the legal 
field. 53  This includes the complexity of incorporating routines of 
systematization and information production into the everyday-work of 
the courts.  
 When the Coordination Unit was created, the Attorney 
General obliged federal prosecutors to report the progress of all cases 
in their jurisdiction on a monthly basis. According to Pablo Parenti, 
who was appointed as coordinator of the Unit, an Excel sheet was 
attached to this resolution with specific “fields”: province, court, case 
number, prosecutor involved, subject of the case, and status of 
proceedings. However, Parenti mentioned that this did not imply the 
development of a methodology, information routine, or any training 
experience: “All of this was done in a very home-made fashion: a few 
people that worked in the prosecutor’s offices did it without any help 
from any IT or statistics professional.”54 For Parenti, in addition to the 
methodological problems, the biggest challenge was to incorporate the 
information tasks into the various judicial offices:  
 
                                                          
52 Author interviews with Carolina Varsky and Pablo Parenti. 
53 Laurence Friedman and Rogelio Pérez Perdomo define legal culture as the “group 
of attitudes, ideas, expectations and values of people about their legal system.” There 
is an internal and an external legal culture; the former relating to the norms and 
practices of legal officers, lawyers and jurists. See Laurence Friedman and Rogelio 
Pérez Perdomo, Legal Culture in the Age of Globalization: Latin America and Latin Europe 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 2.   
54 Interview with Pablo Parenti. 
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We had to get the prosecutors to comply with producing 
reports, something that is not within common judicial practice. 
When one asks for this type of information, what is in play is 
not only that you are creating additional work for an office, but 
also we are asking them for a tool that, afterwards, is useful for 
controlling their work: I think this was the most sensitive part.55 
  
On the other hand, those interviewed expressed frustration 
that the bureaucratic structure of the Attorney General’s Office 
prevented incorporating the necessary methodologies for the 
systematization task, which was an obstacle for the work. In the Unit, 
multiple Excel spreadsheets were used at least up to December 2014, 
thereby complicating the possibility of statistical analysis and reducing 
the efficiency of information production. As Saavedra notes, “We have 
a frankly very defective tool. What we ended up doing was to print and 
paste the pages into a long sausage [sic] and we shouted out the 
names…. We have not been able to overcome this, despite having 
made various attempts.”56 
 Another important aspect was the lack of cooperation between 
the actors involved in the production of information about the trials. 
If the Coordination Unit had access to privileged and reliable 
information, and CELS had certain methodological innovations, closer 
collaboration between the two would have been advisable. Although 
this happened in the first couple of years after the creation of the Unit, 
later on it ceased. In the words of Carolina Varsky, there was a type of 
“inexplicable underhanded competition.”57 
 In addition, available data do not allow for measuring the 
universe of victims whose cases are being investigated in the 
framework of these trials. Up to December 2015, there is no official 
or unofficial data on how many cases of victims have been prosecuted, 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 Interview with Alberto Saavedra. 
57 Interview with Carolina Varsky. 
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how many have had a judgment, conviction, or acquittal,  how many 
of those cases are victims recognized in CONADEP’s records, or how 
many cases of state-recognized victims have not been criminally 
investigated yet. This lack of data prevents the actors involved in trial-
monitoring from designing a clear indicator of effective access to 
justice for the victims.  
   Finally, an issue that needs further analysis is the slow-down 
in the pace of trial proceedings during 2015. There are many trials that 
have been active for the past three years, such as the mega cases called 
“ESMA unificada” and “Operation Condor” in Buenos Aires and “La 
Perla” in Córdoba. However, the number of hearings per week as well 
as the duration of each hearing has fallen significantly. Some actors 
involved in the trials argue the justice process is beginning to show a 
kind of “exhaustion” after ten years of criminal prosecution,58 while 
others believe the changes in broader politics may be influencing the 
judges’ behavior (i.e. the presidential campaign and recent change of 
government).59 It remains to be seen how persistent this trend will be. 
 
Conclusion 
This note from the field is part of a more extensive research project 
that intends to build knowledge on the problems that arise when trying 
to systematically measure gross human rights violations during 
transitions. Measurement systems seem to offer a clear opportunity to 
build the facts and to support transitional justice mechanisms. All 
policy decisions relating to human rights violations usually derive from 
data: defining, identifying, and counting victims and perpetrators and 
clarifying which facts constitute crimes are the baseline to measure the 
phenomenon. 
 Information has been a key element in HROs’ efforts to 
influence public policies locally, to seek international support, and to 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 Author interview with Ana Oberlin, former Legal Director of the National 
Human Rights Secretary (2011-2015), 17 September 2015. 
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achieve accountability. However, information strategies also are 
shaped by debates and disputes among stakeholders as to who 
measures, why, and how. Overall, there are serious shortcomings in 
the techniques and methodologies implemented, particularly by state 
agencies. 
 During the post-transition period, the return of criminal 
prosecution has taken center stage. Regarding information politics, this 
process is the heir to the strategies implemented during the transition. 
At least in its beginning, the information used to put together the cases 
is the one designed at that time. However, the challenge for the 
production of information in this stage will not be the search for 
patterns or the building of cases. Rather, as the justice process extends 
over time (contrary to the abrupt end to criminal proceedings during 
the transition), the information has to be able to reflect the “treatment” that the 
justice system gives to the case, and its effects on legal accountability. This way, the 
information during the post-transition phase not only contributes to 
continuing to file cases in the courts, but also raises questions about 
the justice system’s handling of these cases. Information also provides 
tools to legal professionals, within the framework of the internal legal 
culture, to monitor judicial practices that enable the definition of legal 
strategies. 
 The key variable explaining why some HROs continued to 
provide a strong documentary focus of research and systematization 
while others gradually abandoned it is professionalization. Its effects are 
determinant in understanding how CELS was able to persist in its task 
of systematization, by using it as the basis for its accountability 
struggle. The production of information is a key advocacy element and 
it is clearly affected by professionalization: it implied gradually losing 
the “artisanal” component and giving space to information 
technologies. This is the framework in which CELS databases are 
developed. Of course, they were implemented in several ways, which 
cannot be fully reconstructed here. Nevertheless, their most visible 
and, until now, most influential aspect has been the possibility of 
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monitoring judicial actors, identifying the deficiencies and obstacles of 
trial proceedings, and using data to formulate public policies for trial-
progress. Another important effect of this information production was 
the publicity of the proceedings, as it stimulated journalistic coverage 
of the cases. Trial information is currently “used” not only by 
journalists, but by anyone interested in Argentina’s criminal justice 
process.  
 This case also reveals the tensions between the state and civil 
society. Information production has been one of the state’s weaknesses 
regarding its strategic planning and methodology. The information 
production experience of the Coordination Unit in the Attorney 
General’s Office has not been explored much by academic literature, 
as it deals with a process that is still ongoing. From what was analyzed 
by this research, there appears to be some tension between the 
demands of civil society and the Unit. The clearest source of tension 
is that, while both took up trial monitoring, CELS did so in order to 
have a tool for controlling and monitoring state’s actions, while the 
Unit sought to be the official producer of information on the subject. 
Friction emerged because the two were engaged in competition instead 
of cooperation. There are clear benefits to having the Attorney 
General’s Office—which is independent of the three branches of the 
government—monitor and evaluate the justice process. But it 
continues to be worrisome that the state’s bureaucratic mindset 
prevents it from operating as effectively as civil society, despite facing 
far fewer obstacles. This way, privileged access to the information, 
such as a state institution has, is not a real advantage since there is no 
efficient methodology implemented.  
 Furthermore, information production during the post-
transition period has helped to identify problematic aspects of the 
administration of justice, i.e. the organization of cases, the 
optimization of the proceeding times, and the need to create agencies 
or designate new judges and prosecutors to conduct the trials. Many 
of the organizational problems still remain after almost ten years of 
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sustained trials. As of December 2015, there are more than 500 active 
cases still awaiting trial throughout the country while the process’ 
rhythm begins to slow down.60 
 To conclude, there remains a large gap between the amount of 
information produced and the number of victims whose cases have 
been taken to the courts in the post-transition period. These aspects 
are related to a general problem of victim’s records in Argentina. 
Nearly 9,000 disappearances were recorded by CONADEP, and other 
state agencies have made adjustments and added new data since.61 
However, the state has not cross-referenced different records in order 
to obtain an official reliable figure of the number of victims. This 
aspect of the information is the clearest weakness in terms of 
systemization of information related to the phenomenon of grave 
human rights violations and its treatment by the truth and justice 
mechanisms in the framework of the accountability processes.  
                                                          
60  According to information from the Prosecutorial Unit for Crimes Against 
Humanity available from http://www.fiscales.gob.ar/lesa-humanidad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2015/06/20150612-Informe-Procuradur%C3%ADa-de-
Cr%C3%ADmenes-contra-la-Humanidad.pdf 
61 On 11 December 2015 the Unified Registry of state terrorism’s victims published 
a report on the official recognized victims. They acknowledge 7,018 victims of 
enforced disappearance and 1,613 victims of homicide: 8,631 victims in total. 
However, the report does not explain the adjustments made to CONADEP’s data, 
and states that there are another 3,000 victims of kidnapping and torture not 
considered in the figures, and thus they believe this number to be “incomplete.” They 
clarify that there are other records (such as the reparations’ one and information 
from the trials) that they have not considered and that is the reason they are leaving 
this important amount of cases out. This needs further and deeper study, but a first 
assessment shows it is not very reliable data. The report is available at 
http://www.jus.gob.ar/derechoshumanos/areas-tematicas/ruvte.aspx. 
